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The paper focuses on an analysis of the potential impact that the
behaviorist and ethnomethodological paradigms may have on
academic sociology. Structural analysis in the sociology of
sociology (Friedrichs, 1974; Mullins, 1973) is criticized and
countered with an analysis which stresses the subjective process of
theory acceptance and rejection exploiting Gouldner's concept eJf
"domain assumptions" (1970). Utilizing data from a largesurvey of
sociologists queried during the mid-sixties (Sprehe, 1967), the fit
between various groupings of sociologists' "domain assumptions"
and the "background assumptions " of each theory are analyzed.
The results ofsuch an analysis suggest that ethnomethodology may
be more attractive to certain groupings of sociologists than
behaviorism, thus contradicting in part the argument advanced on
the basis ofa structural analysis. The paper calls for a recognition
of the dialectical interplay between "structural conditions" and
"subjective forces" in the adoption and rejection of theory.
INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the sixties there emerged a
discusssion over which theoretical paradigm would replace
sociology's fallen prince, functionalism (Gouldner, 1970;
Friedrichs, 1970). This paper explores that question further by
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David Sallach, Paul Piccone, Hugh Mehan, Alvin W. Gouldner, and Alan
Johnson. All errors in judgment and substance remain those of the author.
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iti a preliminary analysis which attempts to assess the
post mg f b havior i , , dpotential attractiveness 0 "e aVl~ns~ an
"ethnomethodology" to various groupings of soclOlogtSts. In so
doing we will attempt to take the analysis one step further than
similar analyses, whose main argument tends to be structurally
oriented (Friedrichs 1974; Mullins, 1973). Moreover, the
, d h h th "fit"
extended analysis presente ere attempts to s ~w e .
between the "background assumptions" of the partlcular t~eones
in question and the "domain assumptions" of various groupmgs of
sociologists (Gouldner, 1970:29-35). That the. fit betwe~n the
background assumptions of theory and the domam as~umptlonsof
sociologists has a bearing on the careers of theones has been
demonstrated by Gouldner who notes that:
.•• In some part, theories are accepted or rejected because of the
background assumptions embedded in them. In particular, a social
theory is more likely to be accepted by those who share the
theory's background assumptions and find th~
agreeable .•• social theories and their component concepts contain
a charge of surplus meanings derived in part from their backgro~d
assumptions, and these may congenially resonate the compa~ble
background assumptions of their hearer or may generate a pamful
dissonance (Gouldner, 1970:29).
THESTRUCTURALARGUMrnNT
Those who have attempted a structural analysis of the
dominance or potential· dominance of partiCular theoretical
orientations within sociology have tended to stress fo~r fa~tors:
i) the leaders in the discipline who share that particular
orientation, 2) the departments controlled by ~herent~ of the
theory in question, 3) the books or written matenals which s~rve
as "exemplars" of the type of work called for by t?e theoretlcal
persuasion, and 4) the social, political, and econo~Il1c contexts as
they apply to sociology's need for external material sup~ort.~e
underlying. logic of this approach seems to be t?at theones wluch
are congruent with the material needs of sociology tend .to be
accepted by the most signi£icant institutions and people In the
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discipline. The pivotal positions that these institutions and
significant figures occupy are important in the socialization of new
membe:s into the discipline, thus providing the situational
de~er~mants for the acceptance of the theory in question (see
Friedrichs, 1974, 1970;Gouldner, 1970; Mullins, 1973).
Util~zing th~ type of.an~ysis to assess behaviorism's impact
on Amencan sociology, Friedrichs has concluded that behaviorism
is in an excellent position to "... inherit the claim of sociological
'orthodoxy' in the latter half of the 70's" (1974:3). His reasons
include:. 1) The "manifest" and "latent" support of behaviorism
by leading members of the discipline, namely George C. Homans
and James Coleman (Friedrichs, 1974:4-5). 2) The significant
number ?,~ ~a~uate depar~~ents th~oughout the country which
serve as invisible colleges where disciples of behaviorism teach
and . re~ea~ch (Friedrichs, 1974:6-7). 3) The quality of
behaviorism s exemplars which convey to the student the rules of
the paradigm and concrete research examples; the chief exemplars
being Scott's The Internalization of Norms and Homan's Social
Behavior (Friedrichs, 1974:6).4) And finally, the potential that
behaviorism has in consolidating the position of sociology within
the federal funding bureaucracy (Friedrichs, 1974:5; Tarter,
1973:54; Skinner, 1971). This type of analysis provides tentative
support for the notion that behaviorism, understood as a
co~peting par~d~, has gained a solid foothold in contemporary
SOCIology and IS In an excellent position to extend that status even
further.
When ethnomethodology is likewise assessed, the results are
not as p~omising. A struc~ural ~alysis of ethnomenthodology
wou~d point out the following, which contrast greatly with the
?reVlOUS analysis of behaviorism: 1) The organizational and
intellectual leaders of ethnomethodology, Aaron V. Cicourel and
Harold Garfinkel, do not have hallowed places in academic
sociology (Mullins, 1973:198). 2) Ethnomethodologists are rather
:'g~e~t?ized" in the State University System of California; thus
inhibiting access to large numbers of students and potential
adherents (Mullins, 1973:192-193). 3) The exemplars of
ethnomethodo~ogy, Garfmkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology
(1967) and Cicourel's Method and Measurement in Sociology
45
Mid-American Review of Sociology Behaviorism and Ethnomethodology
(1964), are not adequate in conveying the uniqueness and import
of the ethnomethodological paradigm. l 4) Alas,
ethnomethodology's potential to serve as a draw~ng card ~or
federal monies is low due to its stress on micro-socIology which
does not respond to questions that the federal funding
bureaucracy wants answers to, and on the other ha~d, its
propensity to give the wrong answers when respondmg to
questions of social structure, questions that the federal
government wants so desperately answered.2 Suc~ an anal!sis
obviously must conclude that the ethnomethodologlcal p~ad~
is in a poor position to assume any semblance of paradJ.gIIlatlc
dominance in the discipline of sociology ·
CRITIQUE OF THE STRUCTURAL ARGUMENT
The structural analysis of the potential impact ofbeha~o~sm
and ethnomethodology on sociology has shown that behaVlonsm
is in a much better position than ethnomethodolo~ to ass~me
some semblance of dominance as the leading theoretical paradIgm
in the discipline. It is the contention of this author that such an
analysis may lead to faulty conclusions when used as the only
approach to such a problem. As proof of this let us consider more
closely the underlying logic of this approach. .
As was shown earlier, a large part 0'£ the structural argument
rests on the assumption that graduate departments are able to
provide the situational determinants whereby students come t~
accept one theoretical orientation as opposed to others. That this
is the case is not at -all clear. Graduate students (just as any other
person involved in human interaction) do notpossess blank m~ds
which are just waiting to be stamped with the proper theo.retlcal
perspective or ideology. As human actors. ~hey come ~t~ a
department with at least twenty years of living and assocla~lOn
with other people behind them. This association h~s pro,?"ded
them with a matrix of values, opinions, and beliefs which are held
with little or possibly great resistance to change. The struct.ure of
the department and the theories th~t are. taught there~n are
interpreted through the backdrop of this matrix (part o~~hlch we
have labeled domain assumptions) and thus, values, opmlons, and
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beliefs are ultimately involved in the process of accepting or
rejecting a theoretical paradigm. The structural approach presents
an over-deterministic and over-socialized conception of human
nature that overlooks the active, creative part that humans play in
constructing their reality.
Even if we were to grant that a department can shape the
theoretical orientation of its students with such tyranny, it
becomes problematic as to whether a department could be
monolithic enough to do so. The evidence that has been presented
elsewhere on the number and significance of the proponents of
one theory that are located within certain departments does not
constitute evidence for the conclusion that these departments are
monolithic in regard to that theoretical perspective (Friedrichs,
1974:4; Mullins, 1973:183-212). For instance, although a
chairman of a department such as Homans of Harvard may be
behaviorist, it does not logically follow that the department will
monolithically represent a behaviorist perspective. Few
chairpersons are able to exert such clout, and those who could are
forced through the pressures of students and junior faculty to
attempt to show some evidence of theoretical pluralism. In so
doing they allow the development of competing perspectives that
can serve as alternatives for those who are not in favor of reigning
perspectives (for a similar argument see Morris and Hesslink,
1974:150).
These criticisms tend to weaken the previous hypothesis
regarding the potential impact of behaviorism on sociology, for
much of the support for the assertion was built on the fact that
. behaviorism was gaining a solid following among significant
members and departments in the discipline. Before we discount
the hypothesis completely, we should try to pinpoint just why
behaviorism has been so successful in implanting itself so firmly in
the discipline. The obvious reason that this writer sees (and.which
the structuralist argument brings out) is that it is compatible with
the research interests of sociology's material Godfather, the
federal government. It is this difference with ethnornethodology
that makes its potential impact that much greater. Yet to dwell on
such an economic fact would lead us to the acceptance of a
one-sided economic deterministic explanation. In order to correct
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this, we should seek an analysis which stresses the subjective
dimension which the structuralist argument overlooks.
DOMAIN ASSUMPTIONS AND THEORY
According to Gouldner, many theories are accepted by social
scientists not because they best describe relationships in the
empirical world, but because they best describe the empirical
world of the social scientists. In other words, because they
resonate with the.life experiences of the actor. What makes these
theories intuitively resonate with our life experiences is that the
background assumptions of the theory "coincide or are
compatible with, consensually validate or bring to psychic closure,
the background assumptions held by the viewer" (Gouldner:30).
The background assumptions of the social scientist may range
from beliefs about the world that are very general and liberally
applicable, to assumptions of more limited scope and application.
These latter are called domain assumptions and are further
described by Gouldner as:
... background assumptions applied only to members of a single
domain; they are, in effect, the metaphysics of a domain. Domain
assumptions about man and society might include, for example,
dispositions to believe that men are rational or irrational; that
society is precarious or fundamentally stable; that social problems
will correct themselves without planned intervention; that human
behavior is unpredictable; that man's true humanity resides in his
, feelings and sentiments (Gouldner :31).
Gouldrier's seminalstudy (The Crisis) is an attempt to show
that domain assumptions do have significant consequences for
theory by examining the rise and fall of functionalism, and the
crisis of academic and Marxist sociology. Our interests in the
concepts of "domain assumptions" and "background
assumptions" is to interpret the "fit" between these two as they
pertain to various groupings of sociologists in the cases of
behaviorism and ethnomethodology. In so doing we will be
making use of data collected by Gouldner and Sprehe in the
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mid-sixties on the values and belief systems of sociologists
(Gouldner and Sprehe, 1967).3
The Empirical Background
In November, 1964, Timothy Sprehe, under the direction
~n~ ~ponsorship ?f Alvin Gouldner, sent a questionnaire to every
individual subscnber of the American Sociological Review, or in
other.w?rds, the total membership of the American Sociological
AsSOCIatIOn. The goal of the questionnaire was explained as an
attempt "to explore the informal beliefs of sociologists concerning
res~arch: tea~hing, and writing and, also, the self-concept of the
sociologist himself" (Gouldner and Sprehe, p: 42). The final
report~ prepared by Sprehe as a doctoral dissertation, contained an
analYSIS. of t~e values and beliefs of sociologists in terms of an
occupatlonalldeology. Factor analysis was used to determine the
structure of the occupational ideologies of sociologists, and an
attempt was made to relate these values and beliefs to the socialm~eu .of, sociologists; wh~t is the relationship between asoc~~logtst s val~es and behefs, and educational, occupational,
political, and religious variables (Sprehe, 1967:53).
. . One of the variables that Sprehe attempted to isolate and
utilize w~ that of domain assumptions. He did this first by
constru.ctIng a set of ite~s which h~ thought clustered together
theoretically to be used in the quesnonnaire. Fifteen items were
constructed representing various subthemes about the nature of
~uman behavior. Factor analysis of the results showed that six
Items clustered together to form a factor called domain
assumptions.f rhese.items were; .
Men conduct their lives .in amore rational manner' than we
often think.
Many sociologists underestimate the importance of
rationality in human life.
Most people think human behavior is more complex than it
really is.
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Most people think human behavior is simpler than it really is.
Sociological research is often best conducted if treated as a
game.
By and large, social problems tend to correct themselves
without planned intervention (Sprehe, 1976:260).
These items seem to suggest that assumption about the belief
as to whether or not humans conduct their lives in a rational
manner and whether or not human behavior is simple or complex
consists of the domain assumptions of the group of sociologists
queried by Sprehe (a group numbering 3,441). Although there
might be other domain assumptions in this same group, these were
the only two that were successfully tapped using the method of
questionnaire design and validation.
Having found an empirical referent of domain assumptions
among members of the sociological profession, we may now
compare the background assumptions of our theories in question
to see 'if they differ in any substantial manner with each other on
the questions of the rationality of human behavior and its relative
simplicity or complexity.f If they do then we may hypothesize
the possible consequences by elaborating on the relationships
among groups of sociologists that Sprehe found in his sample. An
example will better illustrate the procedure, If, in our examination
of the background assumptions of ,behaviorism, we find that it
stresses a rational model of human behavior, while
ethnomethodology does not; then we can label it as consistent-
with the domain assumption of rational human action. If
dominant "sociologists (as defined by Sprehe) also responded
positively to this domain assumption then we could say we have
found a "fit" between the background assumptions of theory and
the domain assumptions of our particular group (dominant
sociologists) of sociologists. We could further hypothesize the
consequences of such a fit. In this way we provide a corrective to
the over-deterministic and over-socialized view presented by the
structuralist argument.
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Behaviorism and Ethnomethodology on the Rationality
and Complexity ofHuman Behavior
~eha~orists have. directly commented on the supposed image
of rationality that ~heir theory fosters. According to Skinner, the
concep~,~f reason itself is "the most admired cognitive or mental
process In the conceptual armory of non-behaviorists. Its status
as .a "mental~stic ~onstruct" leads to its epistemological denial by
Skinner. ~at1o?allty. for Skinner is contained in the evolutionary
process WIth .ItS remforcement of actions and practices which
promotes survival of the species (Skinner, 1974:128-136).
As one moves to the sociological behaviorism of a Homans
t~e pi~tur~ c~~ges quite drastically. In the world of "exchange":
~ith its sunilanty to elementary economics, it is very easy to
impute to. th~ actor the s~etype of interest-oriented rationality
that pertains ~ the economic marketplace. Homans is prepared to
accept that this type of rationality exists in some social behavior:
· · · The social climber is an example. Using his explicit knowledge
of the proposition we try to make explicit here, and prepared to
accept-this is his characteristic heroism-certain immediate costs in
self-respect, he may well wind up in a far higher social position
than he would have attained without his calculations and his
peculiar asceticism (Homans, 1961 :81).
But, this type of rationality does not affect most social behavior
and social scientists need not make such an assumption to
properly explain social behavior:
Although calculation for ~he lon~ run plays its part in human
affairs, we make no allowance for it in our propositions, which are
to this extent incomplete. We do not rule it out; neither do we rule
it in. Our first justification is that we shall not often need it to
explain the research results considered in this book. And our
second lies in plain sight: calculation for the long ron is the
exception and not the rule (Homans, 1961 :81).
A1~hough these outright denials may be convincing in a
superfiCial manner, the assumption of rationality seems to be
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deeply imbedded in the behaviorist sociology that Homans
outlines. This is shown implicitly in Homans' discussion of the
similarity of his human exchange propositions to those of
elementary economics:
... Take the Law of Supply in economics: the higher the price of a
commodity, the more of it a supplier will sell. This is equivalent
to-we dare not say identical with-our proposition: the more
valuable the reward gotten by an activity, the more often a man
will emit it. For in the Law of Supply the price of the commodity
is the reward obtained by selling it (Homans, 1961:69).
Although Skinner might deny the existence of rationality,
and Homans its importance, it is sufficiently clear that their
elementary propositions about human behavior contain an implicit
assumption about how humans discriminate between stimuli that
is very close to the traditional notion of rationality. This notion of
rationality posits the objective rationality of human behavior, a
rationality completely independent of individual interpretation
and of social and historical contexts. Thus behavior or response R
is, other things being equal, always and everywhere linked to
stimulus S, so that behavior in the end is predictable on the basis
of this objective rationality. This notion is similar to the type of
rationality that Sprehe's factor was attempting to tap.
The ethnomethodologists differ from the behaviorists on this
assumption. Ethnomethodologists assume that the actor is
involved in a continuous process of interpretation; for Garfmkel it
- is' "documentary interpretation" {Garfinkel, 1967), for Cicourelit
is interpretation b ased o~ "surface and interpretive· rules"
(Cicourel, 1970a and 1970b), and for Zimmerman and Pollner, it
is interpretation through the members "occasioned corpus"
(Zimmerman and Pollner, 1970). The goal that the
ethnomethodologists pursue is the attempt to delineate the rules
whereby members interpret their situations and thus act. These
rules as of yet are unknown and thus the question is left open as
to whether human behavior is rationally motivated as in the
behaviorist paradigm. In order to get at this point more closely, let
us examine the work of Cicourel on this subject.
Behaviorism and Ethnomethodology
The problem for Cicourel is that of social order. If members'
actions are a consequence of their own interpretations of the
situation, then how are common actions possible? In order to
solve this dilemma Cicourel employs two concepts borrowed from
Chomsky's work on generative grammar, surface rules and
interpretive rules (or interpretive procedures). Interpretive rules
"provide the actor with a developmentally changing sense of social
structure that enables him (the actor) to assign meaning or
relevance to an environment of objects" (Cicourel, 1970a:29).
These two types of rules, although analytically separable,
interpenetrate each other to provide for a "sense of social
structure". Thus this model implies that a sense of social structure
or order is made possible whenever interpretive rules are invoked
to justify or evaluate a course of action within a context in which
several norms or surface rules are possible. As Cicourel notes:
... Hence the learning and use of general rules or norms, and their
long-term storage, always require more basic interpretive rules for
recognizing the relevance of actual, changing scenes, orienting the
actor to possible courses of action, the organization of behavioral
displays, and their reflective evaluation by the actor (Cicourel,
1970a:31).
Interpretive rules are invariant, applying to all situations.
Their existence makes possible concerted human behavior and
they are the basis of the ways in which we cognitively organize our
social settings. As a first step in describing these rules, Cicourel has
drawn on the work of Alfred Schutz. ·He notes six features as
described by Schutz which could serve as a beginning in
delineating. the interpretive rules that actors use· (this list is in no
way exhaustive of all the possible rules):
1. The reciprocity of perspectives.
2. The et cetera rule and its subroutines.
3. The idea of normal form typifications.
4. Retrospective-Prospective scene of occurrence.
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5. Talk itself as reflexive.
6. Descriptive vocabularies as indexical expressions.
(Cicourel, 1970b:147-152).
The purpose of this exegesis of Cicourel's .work was to sho~
ethnomethodology's stress on the interpretive process. ThIs
highlights a concern with the subje~tiv~ ratio~ality. of human
behavior. As opposed to the objective rationality of the
behaviorist paradigm, the subjective rationality of
ethnomethodology focuses on the "subjectivity" of human
behavior, the many possible interpretations that can be advanced,
instead of the one objective stimuli that behaviorists point to.
One of the frequent charges leveled against behaviorism by its
critics has been that it treats its subject matter in a simplistic
manner, thus denying the supposed complexity of human
behavior. In commenting on his critics Skinner has rightly shown
that behaviorism has been "especially vulnerable to the charge of
simplification because it is hard to beli~ve that .a f~ly s~ple
principle can have vast consequences m our lives (SkInner,
1974:231). As if to use the same logic as his critics, Skinner turns
around and notes that "the experimental analysis of behavior is a
rigorous, extensive, and rapidly advancing branc~ of bi~lo~, an~
only those who are unaware of its scope can call It oversimplified
(Skinner, 1974:231). Though it cannot be said that the
complexity of methods used in the study of behavior represents a
sure-fire sign..of the complexityo.f the behavior itself, there does
seem to be some congruence between the complex or simple way
subject matter is approached, and the. assumption~ made ~egarding
the complexity or simplicity of human behaV1o~. ThIS seems
especially true of the conceptual apparatus used In theory and
research.
It has been noted by Friedrichs that the conceptual
parsimony of behaviorism is tantalizingly attractive to many
sociologists (Friedrichs, 1974:3). With a corpus of less than ten
well-developed concepts, behaviorists are able to "explain" almost
any phenomenon. The assumption that the behaviorist is dealing
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with the most basic propositions of human behavior adequately
conveys the background. assumption that human behavior is
essentially knowable in all its variations and thus simple to the
eyes of the trained behaviorist.
The ethnomethodologist, on the other hand, has a healthy
respect for the complexity of human behavor. It is highlighted in
the open-ended nature of the theory's self-proclaimed subject
matter: the study of the ways in which members make sense of
their world. .
The most telling fact of ethnomethodology's awareness of
the complexity of human behavior is its reliance on the concept of
"emergence". The use of the concept emergence displays the
recognition of the fact that the actors' definitions of the situation
and actions are not settled permanently through the application of
a norm or some other pre-existing cultural system but are
"interpretations formulated on particular occasions by the
interactor and are subject to reformulation on subsequent
occasions" (Wilson:69).6 Therefore, predictions based on some
sort of normative criteria of behavior are impossible. The creative
and active potential of the actor is emphasized, exhibiting the
richness and complexity of human behavior.
Our analysis has indicated that behaviorism tends to foster a
model of human behavior that stresses the objective rationality of
human activity. This is closest to the common notion of the
concept of rationality in the social sciences whereby it is posited
that there is a reason for each action that can be objectively
pointed to. Along with this stress on objective rationality is a
.. " corresponding .belief in the simplicity of human behavior.
Ethnomethodology, on the other hand, posits a model of human
behavior based on the subjective rationality of human activity.
This type of rationality as distinguished from objective rationality,
takes rationality as more contingent and subjectively determined,
thus positing a multitude of in-order-to motives which lead to
social action.' Furthermore, ethnomethodology assumes that
human behavior is complex, and highlights that complexity
throughout.
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The Fit
Since the background assumptions of behaviorism and
ethnomethodology differ substantially in relation to beliefs about
the rationality and complexity of human behavior, we can now
compare the fit between these assumptions and the dornairr
assumptions (which also concern beliefs about the rationality and
complexity of human behavior) of various groupings of
sociologists as polled by Sprehe. On the basis of a fit or non-fit
between these two dimensions, we will be able to hypothesize
about the tendencies of these groups of sociologists to be
favorable toward or resistant to our theories in question.
In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate items on
a seven-point Likert scale, from Strongly Agree to Strongly
Disagree. A high score on an item would indicate agreement with.
the theme that the item represented, while a low score would
indicate disagreement with the theme. The relevant groupings that
we will be considering are those related to the following variables:
graduates of prestige and non-prestige schools, academic rank,
dominant sociologists, age and political affiliation.
According to Sprehe, respondents who received their highest
degree from prestige schools'' tended to reject or score low on the
items that constituted the factor of domain assumptions.
Meanwhile, those from non-prestige schools scored high on this
factor (Sprehe, 1967:315). It would seem that those who
graduated from prestige schools would find the background
assumptions of behaviorism inconsistent with their domain
assumptions, thus providing a context. in which behaviorism would
. be ·.rejeoted. In the .same way, graduates of non-prestige schools
would be resistant to ethnomethodology's insistence about the
non-rationality and complexity of human behavior.
Academic rank showed no clear pattern in the survey.
Graduate students, for the most part, did not score high or low on
this factor, indicating that they might be inclined to .either view,
depending on the situational context in which they are presented.
This would lend credence to the structural argument which
essentially posits the assumption that students are easily steered to
a theoretical orientation in the proper context. Non-tenured
faculty were found to be polarized at both ends of the scale, one
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group agreeing with the rationality and simplicity of human
behavior and the most numerous group disagreeing. Tenured
faculty were also polarized, but more evenly among those
disagreeing and agreeing with the rational-simplistic model of
human behavior (Sprehe:315). Any interpretationof rhess facts to
our problem. would be very tenuous at this time. The one thing
that they did show was that there is no clear-cut preference in the
academic ranks of tenured and non-tenured faculty that would
lead to the majority acceptance of either ethnomethodology or
behaviorism on the basis of a fit between their domain
assumptions and the background assumptions of the theories.
In order to see if dominant sociologists differed from other
sociologist, Sprehe constructed a measure of dominance which
included four variables: prestige school of origin, size of
employing institution, amount of research funds and an index of
professional participation. The findings in regard to domain
assumptions and dominance pointed out that dominant
sociologists did not hold a rational model of human behavior and
did not believe that behavior was essentially simple (Sprehe:317).
This finding, when combined with the structural argument, would
lend support to the notion that ethnomethodology would receive
a better reception among dominant sociologists than behaviorism.
The domain assumptions of dominant sociologists resonate with
the background assumptions of ethnomethodology to a much
greater degree than those of behaviorism.
The variable of age clarifies somewhat the relationship noted
earlier between academic rank and domain assumptions. Among
'. graduate students, the _younger ages scored higher on this factor.
Tenured faculty tended to agree more strongly with the
rational-simplistic model as age' increased. Non-tenured faculty
also started agreeing with this model after age 40. This relationship
held constant even when considering the prestige or non-prestige
origin of the respondents higher degree. Age, instead of academic
position, seems to have the most to do with whether or not a
respondent scores high or low on the factor. The youngest and
oldest respondents were most likely to score high on· the factor
while non-tenured faculty under 40 years of age scored low
(Sprehe, 1967 :454-456). Therefore, it would seem that the older
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colleagues in the discipline would be more receptive to
behaviorism and that their influence on young graduate students
early in their graduate careers would be greater.
The final grouping is based on political affiliation. One of the
interesting and relevant fmdings on this variable was that
respondents in their twenties tended to score high on the factor,
"especially those of more conservative political preference"
(Sprehe, 1967:459). The only exception in this age group was
those whose political affiliation was listed as socialist. This same
pattern emerged in the age 30 to 40 and 40 to 50 age group. As
age increased, the socialists' support for the rational-simplistic
model increased also (Sprehe, 1967:459). Therefore, one would
expect that those younger sociologists whose political orientation
is expressly radical would be sympathetic and attracted to the
background assumptions of ethnomethodology, while those of
liberal-conservative political orientation would be more inclined
toward the behaviorist rational-simplistic model. 9
This analysis has investigated the fit between the domain
assumptions of various groupings of sociologists and the
background assumptions of ethnomethodology and behaviorism.
The findings indicate that sociologists with degrees from
non-prestige schools, those that are very young and very old, and
those with liberal to conservative political orientation possess the
domain assumptions that would resonate with the background
assumptions of the behaviorist orientation. Thus, it is quite
probable that these sociologists would intuitively accept the
behaviorist paradigm. In the same vein, the analysis has shown the
sociologists with. degrees from. prestige. schools, sociologists that
are dominant, non-tenured faculty younger than 40, and those
with socialistic .political affiliation, possess the domain
assumptions that would resonate with the background
assumptions of ethnomethodology. Therefore, we posit the
increased probability of the intuitive acceptance of the
ethnomethodological paradigm by these particular groupings of
sociologists.
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SUMMARY
This paper has produced two different analyses concerning
the viability of behaviorism and ethnomethodology .in the
assumption of paradigmatic dominance in the field. One analysis
which was termed structural, led to the tentative conclusion that
behaviorism was in a much better position to assume theoretical
dominance in the discipline than ethnomethodology. The other
analysis, which concerned the fit between the background
assumptions of theory and the domain assumptions of various
groupings of sociologists, was less clear-cut than the structural
argument, but nevertheless did show that there might be greater
support for ethnomethodology than was originally predicted in
the structural argument. 1 0
The purpose of this paper was to offset the purely structural
accounts of theory development that overlook the subjective
aspect of theory acceptance and rejection (Friedrichs, 1974;
Mullin, 1973). The "behaviorist band wagon" debate that was
started by Friedrichs' excellent analysis of behaviorism's effect on
sociology (1974), needs to take in to consideration that theory is
made, accepted, and rejected, in part, on the basis of the "personal
reality" of the theoretician; not only on the basis of impersonal
structural forces. A complete explanation of theory development
would be a dialectical one, which would take into account the
interplay between structural forces, the personal realities of the
theorist, and the background assumptions of theory itself.
NOTES.
1. The problem With these works as exemplars is that they fail to give us a
concrete example of what kind of empirical project the
ethnomethodological paradigm demands. Although Garfinkel parades us
through his at times ghastly experiments and his equally interesting case
of "Agnes", we are still left with very little knowledge about what one
does after one becomes an ethnomethodologist. The purely empirical
works thus far published also fail to show us what is so unique about an
ethnomethodological approach to the empirical world.
Ethnomethodology's failure to produce an exemplar that combines both
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a theoretical and empirical example has hindered the potential that
ethnomethodology could have through the teaching and training of a
new generation of sociologists. The prime candidate for the new
exemplar of ethnomethodology seems to be Mehan and Wood's The
Reality of Ethnomethodology (1975). The first real
ethnomethodological textbook, it attempts to convey to the reader the
uniqueness of the ethnomethodological paradigm by divorcing it from
all ties with standard sociology; "Sociology and ethnomethodolgy are
separate enterprises, engaging different phenomena" (1975:6). Its use as
an exemplar is impaired by this very separation of ethnomethodology
from sociology.
There are actually two sides to the compatibility of ethnomethodology
with the federal funding bureaucracy. On one side there are those
ethnomethodologists who are concerned mainly with micro-sociology,
e.g., how are conversations opened (Schegloff, 1968). It would. appear
that this type of analysis would be too vague when applied to the
macro-social problems of today to make funding ethnornethodology
profitable. On the other side are those ethnomethodologists concerned
with social structure who are mainly centered around Cicourel. This
interest in social structure has taken concrete form in his research on the
juvenile justice system (Cicourel, 1968), the schools (Cicourel and
Kituse, 1963; Cicourel et al., 1974), fertility (Cicourel, 1974), and most
recently, health care delivery systems (Cicourel, 1975). Although this
list seems impressive, Cicourel's relationship with the federal funding
bureaucracy may well be a short-lived affair. Unlike behaviorism,
Cicourelian ethnomethodology will not be able to give the
control-oriented information that the..federal government is interested in
obtaining (National Science Foundation, 1969). If history can be
trusted', it 'seems that the type of information that has come out of
former research by Cicourel and his students has been insidious critiques
of the way these structures are organized so as to create the very
problems which the government is trying to control (Cicourel, 1968).
This type of critique would require more than just piecemeal reform to
remedy, thus making the results of such research useless to the federal
funding bureaucracy for obvious reasons.
3.
4.
5.
6.
A1thoug~ the discu.ssion draws on Gouldner's elaboration of the concept
of domain assumptIons, some problematic aspects of this method should
be ~ointed out. Our heavy reliance on this concept short-circuits a larger
SOCIology of knowledge approach which would address how domain
assumptions interact with self-interest and life experience and how that
interaction modifies the domain assumptions, making any reference to a
static concept of domain assumptions impossible. However, in order to
do the type of analysis that this paper calls for we must treat domain
assumptions as a static concept represented by the answers obtained in
the questionnaire given by Sprehe. The author is aware of the changing
nature of domain assumptions and does not agree with the picture that
Gouldner paints of the similarity between domain assumptions and
stereotypes (Gouldner, 1970 :32-3).
Sprehe does not use the term "domain assumptions" to characterize this
factor. The first term that he used was "metaphysical assumptions
concerning man and society" but this title was dropped after it was
pointed out that "metaphysics is not commonly applied to man and/or
society" (Sprehe, 1967 :64). In order to avoid any confusion he changed
it to "Metaphorical Assumptions Concerning Men and Society". The
definition that Sprehe unfolds (1967:67-74) is consistent with ours (and
Gouldner's) and in order to avoid confusion in our analysis we will refer
to this factor as "domain assumptions" throughout our discussion.
The reader must keep in mind that the utilization of empirical data
collected in the mid-sixties can only lead to suggestive relationships on
this question. For that reason no attempt is made to present the results
i.p the quantitativ.e fashion that they are found in Sprehe (1967). T.his
re-analysis is meant to serve as an example of the type of analysis that
must supplement structural analyses now being done in the sociology of
sociology if the complete picture is to be uncovered.
For an extended discussion on the concept of emergence, see McHugh's
Defining the Situation: The Organization of Meaning in Social
Interaction (McHugh, 1968).
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1. Write as if explaining to your graduate student peers-persons
at about your level of preparation (or somewhat lower) but
without your knowledge of the particular subject matter.
Don't address yourself to your professor, as you will usually
assume he is more sophisticated than he is, and you will not
enunciate the elementary truths that require to be said.
2. Proceed as if writing a "working paper" or "research report."
Try to write clearly, simply, precisely, describing exactly
what you are finding out. Or, to put it negatively, do not try
to write a brilliant essay and, above all, do not imitate the
abominably turgid style characteristic of many social
scientists.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Dear Editor:
Herewith submitted for consideration for the inclusion in
MARS is "A Guide to the Perplexed". I don't claim profound
originality to the contents, but many students have said that they
found it useful.
3. It is more important to be accurate, precise, and honest, than
to be original, creative, or insightful. Tell it like it is. Telling
it like it is may prove to be the thing most useful.
5. It is easier to refine a written draft than it is to translate
inchoate thoughts directly into a finished report. Hence,
write-however poorly and disorganizedly-but then rewrite,
edit, and rewrite again... and rewrite again ... and again. But
you cannot rewrite unless first you write.
4. Experience and thought are multidimensional; wntmg is
linear. Write about one thing at a time, then go on to .the
next thing. Translating the multidimensional into the linear
'sequential is one of the most difficult elements to acquire of
good writing style.
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